FLORIDA RECREATIONAL VEHICLE MEDIATION/ARBITRATION PROGRAM
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION

DECISION OF THE ARBITRATOR
(DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION)

 

In the Matter of the Arbitration between

WILFORD AND MARY WOODRUFF,

Claimants,

-and-

FLEETWOOD MOTOR HOMES AND

FORD MOTOR COMPANY,

Respondents.

CASE NO. 33 424 00012 99 DRO

DATE (ORIGINAL) CLAIM RECEIVED BY AAA: August 3, 1999

Pursuant to notice to all parties, a telephonic arbitration hearing was held in this case on January 31, 2000 through the Orlando, Florida AAA office upon the motions to dismiss filed by respondents Fleetwood Motor Homes ("Fleetwood") and Ford Motor Company ("Ford"). In attendance by telephone were the claimants, Mr. and Mrs. Woodruff, Messrs. Scott Powell and William Bromagen, counsel for Fleetwood and Ford, respectively, Ms. Dorothy O'Brien of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"), and the undersigned arbitrator.

Upon consideration of the record, the law, arguments of the Woodruffs and of counsel for the respondents, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is hereby FOUND:

  1. The parties reached a mediated, written settlement agreement on September-20. 1999 ("the settlement agreement").
  2. There being no objection to Ford's motion to dismiss by the Woodruffs or by Fleetwood, and it appearing to be undisputed by the parties that Ford is not responsible in any event for the defects complained of, Ford's motion to dismiss should be granted, with prejudice.
  3. It further appears to be uncontradicted and undisputed that:
    1. The motor home was returned to the Woodruffs and
    2. The $3,500 settlement check was given to the Woodruffs by Fleetwood, no later, in all events, than December 16, 1999;
    3. The Woodruffs did not attempt to give even verbal notification to AAA that they believed Fleetwood to have breached the settlement agreement until December 28, 1999; and
    4. The ten day window permitted under 681.1097(4)(g), Fla. Stat. (1999) to demand arbitration for alleged breaches of settlement agreements ended on Monday, December 27, 1999, the first weekday closing the ten day window.
    5. The first written communication by the Woodruffs to AAA expressing their dissatisfaction with performance under the settlement agreement was dated January 5, 2000 and bears a fax transmittal date of January 4, 2000.
  4. It further appears that some of the complaints asserted by the Woodruffs in their written communication to AAA dated January 5, 2000 may not be arbitratable under Chapter 681, Fla. Stat. (1999) in any event, because they appear to constitute grievances with "living facilities." "Living facilities of recreational vehicles" are expressly excluded from the definition of "motor vehicles" and thus, by implication, from mandatory arbitration, by the legislature's crafting of 681.102(15), Fla. Stat. (1999).
  5. The settlement agreement conspicuously required, at the bottom of the page signed by the parties, that "[i]f the manufacturer fails to perform within the time required, the consumer must notify the AAA of such failure in writing within ten days ... of the required performance date." [emphasis added] Page 5, & C of AAA's "Florida Recreational Vehicle Program Procedural Guide To Mediation/ Arbitration," which this arbitrator understands is furnished to all consumers upon the inception of an arbitration, has a similar warning.

Therefore, I hereby AWARD as follows:

A. Ford's motion to dismiss is hereby granted with prejudice.

B. Fleetwood's motion to dismiss is granted for lack of jurisdiction.

C. This arbitrator is not finding and cannot find for either side, the Woodruffs or Fleetwood, on the relative merits or lack of merit of the underlying grievances of the Woodruffs. Rather, this arbitrator is expressly ruling only that whatever disputes the Woodruffs may have with Fleetwood must be brought in a different forum than this arbitration proceeding, because this arbitrator lacks jurisdiction to entertain them under the express time constraints and subject matter constraints imposed by the legislature in its above-cited enactments 681.1097(4)(g) and 681.102(15), Fla. Stat. (1999). The wisdom or not of these constraints is for the legislature to determine, not for this arbitrator to modify by judicial fiat.

D. If and to the extent one considers meritorious the Woodruffs' pro seassertion that the ten day statutory deadline was, in their opinion, onerous and created undue hardship as applied to their particular circumstances because of the Christmas holidays, the need, in their opinion, to test-drive the vehicle a considerable distance to determine whether the manufacturer had complied with the settlement agreement, etc., this arbitrator finds that any such hardship does not rise to constitutional denial of due process or equal protection because, by the dismissal of this action, the Woodruffs are not being deprived of the right to have their grievances heard; they are merely being denied their choice of forum - i.e., arbitration versus litigation. Cf. 681.1097(3)(d), and 681.112(3), Fla. Stat. (1999). Nor are they being deprived of whatever rights, if any, may exist under any warranties.

E. As this arbitrator announced during the January 31, 2000 hearing, the Orange County Bar Association makes available through its lawyer referral service, phone no. (407) 425-4537, the names of various private attorneys who agree to consult with individuals regarding legal problems for a nominal initial consultation fee, if the Woodruffs desire to avail themselves of this service.

F. This Order is executed in full settlement of all claims submitted in this arbitration.

EXECUTED in Orlando, Florida this 10 day of February, 2000, to be effective as of the date of filing with the AAA.

Kenneth L. Mann, Arhitrator

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